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A Critical Appraisal of Criminal 
Deterrence Theory 
Kevin C. Kennedy* 
I. Introduction 
The search for improved methods of crime control has been un-
ending. There is little question that effective deterrence of criminal 
behavior has been the raison d'etre of this search. The hope of deter-
rence has fueled this quest in part through its implicit promise, pro-
vided that the right combination of law enforcement techniques and 
tools are employed, of attaining a crime-free society. 
What are the assumptions upon which criminal deterrence the-
ory is based? Are these assumptions valid? What are the hidden im-
plications of the criminal deterrence theory? Is it wise to continue to 
expend society's energies in the battle against crime with deterrence 
as a guide? After a discussion of criminal deterrence theory's basic 
principles, l this article examines the assumptions and implications 
supporting the theory':" critiques those assumptions and implicationsS 
and offers an alternative to deterrence theory.' 
II. General Principles of Criminal Deterrence Theory 
A. Background 
Criminal deterrence has been divided broadly into two catego-
ries, prevention and deterrence; each of these categories have been 
divided further into two subcategories, special and generaJ.G The pre-
ventive dimension of criminal deterrence has been defined as follows: 
In the broad usage, a deterrent is anything which exerts a 
preventive force against crime. Usually, but not necessarily, we 
are interested in the preventive effects of crime control measures 
• A.B. 1973, University of Michigan; J.D. 1977, Wayne State University Law School; 
LL.M. 1982, Harvard Law School. The author is a law clerk to Senior Judge Herbert N. 
Maletz o"r the United States Court of International Trade in New York City. 
I. See infra notes 5-25 and accompanying text. 
2. See infra notes 26-51 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 52-79 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
5. D. BEYLEVELD, A BIBLIOGRAPHY ON GENERAL DETERRENCE RESEARCH xx (1978). 
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which are introduced by law enforcement agencies. In this case, 
an interest in the broad deterrent effectiveness of these measures 
is an interest in their crime preventive effectiveness by whatever 
means prevention is achieved.8 
The deterrent dimension-the second broad category and the 
major focus of this article-has been defined as the "control or alter-
ation of present and future criminal behavior which is effected by 
fear of adverse extrinsic consequences resulting from that behav-
ior.'" This dimension is, in essence, the deliberate threat of harm, 
communicated to the public generally, to discourage socially pro-
scribed conduct across all society.s 
Jeremy Bentham and Cesare Beccaria are responsible for some 
of the earliest formulations of criminal deterrence theory.s Bentham 
was convinced that crime rose from the conscious, rational consider-
ations of the individua1.1o Accordingly, a person contemplating the 
commission of a crime would undertake a cost-benefit analysis and 
would execute the criminal plan only if potential benefits sufficiently 
outweighed expected costs. Under this thesis, the task of law en-
forcement personnel and lawmakers was clear: the risks, or costs, for 
a potential criminal had to be so great that he would have far more 
to lose than to gain from committing a crime.ll Today, criminal de-
terrence theorists continue to rely on this model, called the economic 
model of the rational actor, to explain and predict criminal 
behavior. 11 
In addition to theorists, courts have adopted the rational actor 
model as a justification for the imposition of certain penalties, specif-
6. [d. at xvi. 
7. [d. Special deterrence focuses on the alteration of the behavior of the individual law 
violator. 
8. See Walker, The Efficacy and Morality of Deterrents, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 129 
[hereinafter cited as Walker]. 
9. See generally C.BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1963) 
[hereinafter cited as BECCARIA]; J. BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW (1843). The roots of 
deterrence can be traced as far back as antiquity when warring monarchs exchanged hostages 
as a peace preservation measure. See T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 20, 135-37 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as SCHELLING I. 
10. See J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 7 (1974). 
11. [d. at 7,110. 
12. See. e.g .• J. SEDGWICK, DETERRING CRIMINALS: POLICY MAKING AND THE AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL TRADITION 16-18 (1980) [hereinafter cited as SEDGWICK); Geerken & Gove, 
Deterrence: Some Theoretical Considerations, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 497 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as Geerken & Gove]. This model of human behavior assumes not just intelligent acts, 
but also "certain kinds of consistency in the behavior of ... hypothetical participants .... " 
SCHELLING, supra note 9, at 4. The economic model offers the advantage of simplicity. See 
SEDGWICK, supra note 12, at 17. A researcher can explain the behavior of deviants and 
nondeviants in the same terms using the same theory. See also G.T. ALLISON, EssENCE OF 
DECISION 29 (1971), in which the author notes that "rationality refers to an essentially 
Hobbesian notion of consistent, value-maximizing reckoning or adaptation within sPecified 
constraints. In economics, to choose rationally is to select the most efficient alternative. . . ." 
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ically the death penalty for the crime of murder.ls In Gregg v. Geor-
gia,!" the United States Supreme Court conceded that "there are 
murderers, such as those who act in passion, for whom the threat of 
death has little or no deterrent effect."ltl Nevertheless, the Court 
noted the existence of certain types of calculated murder-like mur-
der for hire and extortion murder of hostages-against which "the 
death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent."18 The Court's 
statement that "there are carefully contemplated murders ... 
where the possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold 
calculus that precedes that decision to act"17 illustrates its reliance 
on the rational actor model. 
In addition to employing models of rational behavior in their 
work, modern deterrence theorists consider the moral influence of 
the law as a preventive factor. 18 At the same time, however, propo-
nents of these theories concede that the effectiveness of deterrence in 
part may be the result of an "unconscious and emotional [inhibi-
tion], drawing upon deep rooted fear and aspirations."19 Deterrence 
theory thus has not only a moralizing and educational facet, but an 
inhibitory and habituating dimension as wel1.20 
Under general deterrence theory persons are punished for vio-
lating the criminal law to serve as object lessons for the rest of soci-
ety. Society, according to the theory, thus transmits the following 
message: It is wrong to behave in certain ways, and if a person 
behaves in one of those ways and fails to obey the law, society will 
punish him or her accordingly. The expression of society's disappro-
bation is punishment. Punishment, as a medium for communicating 
the deterrence message, creates "conscious and unconscious inhibi-
tions against committing crime,"u and results in habitual compli-
ance by society as a whole. 
According to several criminal deterrence theorists, the punish-
ment imposed for an offense should be proportional to the severity of 
the offense. One rationale for the principle of proportionality is that 
any excess punishment is unjust and represents little more than an 
13. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185-86 (1976). 
14. Id. at 153. 
15. Id. at 185. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 185-86 (footnote omitted). 
18. See. e.g .• ANDENAES, supra note 10, at 42. These theorists consider the effect of 
deterrence to be moralizing. A major criticism of the theory, however, is the lack of a moral 
dimension in the process of developing a deterrence system. See supra notes 58-74 and accom-
panying text. 
19. ANDENAES, supra note 10, at 42. 
20. See id. at 8; Hawkins, Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative. Moralizing and 
Habituative Effects. 1969 WIS. L. REV. 550-65. 
21. Andenaes, General Prevention: Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L.. CRIMINOLOGY 
& POLICE SCI. 176, 179 (1952). 
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act of societal violence.1I1i Perhaps a more important rationale is 
grounded in the prominent role which law itself must play in a deter-
rence theory. The principle of proportionality has constitutional un-
derpinnings in the due processl8 and cruel and unusual punishment24 
clauses of the United States Constitution. These provisions, as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court, prohibit governmental imposition of 
punishment that either is grossly disproportionate to the offense or 
makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punish-
ment. Such punishment is nothing more than a senseless infliction of 
pain and suffering/~II 
B. Requisites for Effective Deterrence 
Beccaria and Bentham believed that the rate.of commission of a 
particular offense varies inversely with the celerity, certainty and se-
verity of punishment for that crime.lIs Although these theorists con-
sidered the swiftness of punishment in calculating the effectiveness 
of a deterrent, modern theorists concentrate on the dyad of certainty 
and severity.27 
1. Certainty and Severity.-Relying on these two variables, 
proponents of the criminal deterrence model of utility maximization 
state that, as the probability of conviction or severity of punishment 
increases, the amount of crime decreases.s8 The consensus is that 
certainty of punishment is more important than severity of punish-
ment in deterring crime.ss As noted by two theorists, "[s]everity only 
has a deterrent impact when the certainty level is high enough to 
22. See BECCARIA. supra note 9. at 121. 131-32. 
23. U.S. CONST.amend. V provides in part that "[nlo person shall be ... deprived of 
life. liberty. or property. without due process of law .... " U.S.CONST. amend. XIV. § I 
provides in part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life. liberty. or property. without 
due process of law .... " 
24. U.S. CONST. amend VIII provides as follows: "Excessive bail shall not be required. 
nor excessive fines imposed. nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 
25. See. e.g .. Helm v. South Dakota. 51 U.s.L.W. 5019 (June 28. 1983) (sentence of 
life imprisonment without possibility of parole significantly disproportionate for nonviolent 
crimes); Coker v. Georgia. 433 U.S. 584. 592 (1978) (capital punishment for rape excessive 
and disproportionate); Robinson v. California. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (sentence of 90 days for 
drug addiction violation of cruel and unusual punishment clause). Compare Rummel v. Es-
telle. 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Gregg v. Georgia •. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
26. See J.P. GIBBS. CRIME. PuNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 5 (1975); BECCARIA. supra 
note 9. 
27. The celerity or speed with which punishment is imposed following the commission of 
a crime was considered important to ensure that the educative and moralizing aspects of pun-
ishment would not be lost on the criminal. The sooner punishment was imposed. therefore. the 
better reformed the criminal would be. 
28. SEDGWICK. supra note 12. at 17. 
29. See, e.g., ANDENAES. supra note 10. at 185; F. ZIMRING &. G. HAWKINS. DETER-
RENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 161 (1973); Antunes &. Hunt. The Deterrent 
Impact of Criminal Sanctions: Some ImplicatiOns for Criminal Justice Policy, 51 J. URBAN 
L. 145. 161 (1973). . 
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make severity salient."8o The relationship between certainty and se-
verity as indicated in a number of criminal justice studies,81 shows a 
statistically significant inverse relation between index crime rates82 
and the certainty of punishment.88 The theorists do not agree, how-
ever, that severity of punishment and the index crime rates are nega-
tively related.84 
Statistics support the conclusion that certainty of punishment 
deters crime more than severity of punishment. The question re-
mains, however, whether objective certainty is critical to deterrence, 
or whether subjective certainty suffices. Researchers agree that the 
effectiveness of deterrence depends more on the perception of cer-
tainty than on the objective reality of certainty.81i Some, however, 
contend that no punishment can deter unless the punishment is per-
ceived as being severe.8e But again, the perception of risk more than 
the actual risk seems to be important,87 and the subjective 
probability of punishment is a greater deterrent than its subjective 
unpleasantness.88 
2. Credibility and Communication.-Certainty and severity of 
punishment undoubtedly are necessary to make deterrence effective, 
but alone they are insufficient. For a threat of punishment to be ef-
fective as a deterrent, the threat must be credible and communi-
cated.89 For credibility to be achieved, the threatened target group 
must believe that the system is capable of apprehending and punish-
ing some offenders.40 Personal experience and police presence appar-
ently have the greatest impact on perceptions of credibility.41 An in-
crease in the number of law enforcement personnel raises the 
objective probability of' apprehension and, more importantly, in-
creases the perceived credibility of threats in those who personally 
30. Antunes & Hunt. supra note 29, at 151. 
31. G. NEWMAN, THE PuNISHMENT RESPONSE 242 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NEW-
MAN]. See generally Note, Creative Punishment: A Study of Effective Sentencing Alterna-
tives. 14 WASHBURN L.J. 57 (1975). 
32. The FBI annually publishes rates of commission of seven index crimes including 
nonnegiigent homicide, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny in excess of $50 and auto 
theft. 
33. SEDGWICK, supra note 12, at 22-25. 
34. Id. at 25. 
35. See. e.g .• GIBBS, supra note 26, at 115; J. Andenaes, General Prevention Revisited: 
Research and Policy Implications, 66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 338, 362 (1975). 
36. See GIBBS, supra note 26, at 119. 
37. See Geerken & Gove, supra note 12, at 498, 501. 
38. Walket, supra note 8, at 133. 
39. F. ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 65-66 (1971). 
40. Id. at 76. 
41. Id. at 71. Nevertheless, would-be law violators may have a realistically high incen-
tive to commit crimes. A potential law violator, evaluating the risks of apprehension, knows 
that law enforcement personnel cannot be in all places simultaneously. Each criminal knows 
that he or she literally may be able to get away with murder. 
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have experienced arrest.42 
The communication of threats of punishment has a key role in 
the deterrence of criminal behavior, but only to the extent that the 
punisher communicates a rational basis for the punishment. Commu-
nication of the rationale improves the effectiveness of deterrence43 by 
compensating for the effectiveness lost as a result of low intensity 
punishment. 44 
C. Obstacles to Effective Deterrence 
Several obstacles must be overcome to achieve effective deter-
rence. First, deterrence might fail if any societal condition exists that 
undermines the successful transmission or reception of the deter-
rence message.41i Some suggest that, if a threat creates uncertainty 
about the sanctions to be imposed, the threat might be a more effec-
tive deterrent than a threat purporting to communicate a complete 
description of the sanctions.46 Thus, Geerken and Gove have posited 
as follows: "The more members of a social system have detailed 
knowledge about crime[,] the more specific the deterrence message 
and the less efficient the deterrence system."n Frank Zimring, who 
supports this view, suggests that the effects of personal experience 
are powerful enough to erode the effects of publicity,48 if that public-
ity is contrary to one's personal experience. 
Although ir might be desirable, therefore, to inject some ambi-
guity into the deterrence message, principles of constitutional law 
clearly prohibit vagueness in proscribing certain conduct and in pre-
scribing sanctions for that conduct. Criminal laws must define ex-
plicitly proscribed conduct and the maximum punishment for a vio-
lation of the law. Those applying the law in this nation must adhere 
to the legal maxim, nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege.49 
The due process clause bars enforcement of any unduly vague or 
42. [d. Even if a violator is apprehended, he or she may perceive that the system is 
unwilling or unable to impose the punishment threatened. This perception would serve as a 
further incentive for committing a crime, or at least would minimize the effect of the threat of 
punishment as a disincentive. This result is even more probable if short or otherwise lenient 
sentences frequently are imposed on offenders and if actual time served is short. 
43. NEWMAN, supra note 31, at 238-39. 
44. [d. at 242-43. Because perceptions and the communication of a rationale are funda-
mental to deterrence effectiveness, the penal system should become a mechanism for informa-
tion transfer, rather than simply remain a sanctioning system. [d. 
45. Geerken & Gove, supra note 12, at 500. 
46. See. e.g .. ZIMRING, supra note 39, at 57; Geerken & Gove, supra note 12, at 507. 
47. Geerken & Gove, supra note 12, at 507. 
48. See ZIMRING, supra note 39, at 72. Persons who are exposed to pUblicity campaigns, 
and who subsequently are persuaded by other information that the risks of detection are not as 
represented, might discount any future announcements on crime prevention and detection tech-
niques. Publicity without substance may decrease the general credibility of law enforcement 
threats. [d. 
49. "No crime or punishment without a law." 
6 
HeinOnline -- 88 Dick. L. Rev. 7 1983-1984
overbroad criminal statute. IIO A law must be sufficiently clear so that 
a person of ordinary intelligence should know in advance the nature 
of unlawful conduct.1I1 
Deterrence is based on the psychological assumption that the 
subjective certainty and unpleasantness of punishment discourages 
the community from engaging in criminal behavior. The social 
stigma attached to a conviction is part of the punishment and, in 
some instances, may have a greater deterrent effect than the term of 
imprisonment itself. 
III. A Critique of the Criminal Deterrence Theory 
Critics of criminal deterrence theory attack the theory on sev-
eral grounds. First, they claim that the rational actor economic 
model does not reflect reality and thereby presents a distorted pic-
ture of the object of deterrence. Reliance on the rational actor model 
of criminal behavior has been criticized for its major premise that· 
individuals are, in the words of Veblen, "lightening calculators of 
pains and pleasures."111 The assumption that persons a/ways care-
fully weigh the consequences of their criminal conduct beforehand 
easily can be refuted by the observation that some crimes are sponta-
neous acts, highly emotional in character.lls Indeed, some commenta-
tors categorize crimes as either instrumental or expressive. The for-
mer is for material gain and includes rational planning; the latter is 
motivated by passion. II. A person possessing a strong emotional com-
mitment to the perpetration of a particular offense is not likely to be 
deterred from committing it, regardless of the sanctions imposed." 
A second criticism of deterrence theory is that, even though it is 
impossible to prove the deterrent effect of punishment, society con-
tinues to invoke "deterrence" to justify the imposition of punishment 
on individuals. Empirically, the burgeoning docket of criminal cases 
illustrates that deterrence has not been effective to any substantial 
degree. The effectiveness of deterrence cannot be demonstrated con-
clusively because researchers employ a scientific method of inquiry 
which attempts to disprove hypotheses rather than prove them." 
50. See, e.g., United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.s. 
928 (1980). 
51. See, e.g .• Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Grayned v. City 
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 
(1970). 
52. See BEYLEVELD, supra note 5, at xxxvi; Hawkins, supra note 20. 
53. See N.WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY 97 (1972); 
McGee, A New Look at Sentencing. 38 FED. PROBATION 3, 5 (1974). 
54. See. e.g .. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 185-86. ZIMRING, supra note 39, at 54. 
55. See JOHNSON, CRIME, CORRECTIONS AND SOCIETY 639 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 
JOHNSON]. 
56. See Gregg v. Genrgia, 428 U.S. at 185; N. WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER AND 
STIGMA: THE MORALITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 79 (1980) [hereinafter cited as WALKER]. 
7 
HeinOnline -- 88 Dick. L. Rev. 8 1983-1984
Successful falsification results in the hypothesis being modified, 
retested and further modified if necessary." Meanwhile the untested 
hypotheses, which remain to be disproved, are used to rationalize the 
logic of inflicting punishment, despite the lack of proof that any so-
cial good is achieved through punishment. 
Third, deterrence theory lacks a sound moral foundation, which 
ultimately undermines the punishment's effectiveness in deterring 
crime. Deterrence in its simplest form requires a regime of compul-
sion and coercion; the regime's effectiveness depends on positive re-
sponses to threats. For a deterrence theory to be a complete theory, 
however, a moral element should be added to the twin pillars of cer-
tainty and severity of punishment. This moral element is social legit-
imacy of the criminal justice system.1I8 Without respect for the crimi-
nal justice system grounded in morality, the system and its code of 
proscriptions, in the long run, will experience a breakdown in the 
form of disobedience. "[R]espect for authority depends on recogni-
tion of its legitimacy."119 
The absence of a moral dimension in deterrence theory is best 
understood by examining the methodology of deterrence theorists. 
Various extralegal conditions must be considered before theorists can 
declare with confidence that a particular punishment is an effective 
deterrent. For example, social condemnation, unemployment and low 
income can have inhibitory or generative effects on the crime rate80 
and therefore should be considered by deterrence theorists. The theo-
rists, however, do not implement control measures in their studies for 
these extralegal conditions81 because these conditions defy incorpora-
tion into deterrence theory.811 Similarly, deterrence theorists are una-
ble to incorporate a moral dimension. 
Because deterrence theory lacks a moral dimension, two more 
specific criticisms continually are leveled at the theory. First, the 
theory can easily be associated with inhumane forms of punishment, 
particularly capital punishment, and excessive types of punishment, 
like mandatory life sentences for a succession of relatively minor of-
fenses and statutorily imposed minimum sentences. Second, deter-
rence theory is based on the deliberate threat of harm; if the system 
Karl Popper rejected induction, insisting that conclusions must be drawn by deductive reason-
ing. See generally K. POPPER, THE I.,OGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959). Popper's greatest 
legacy was the innovative view that the results of tests can only falsify, but never verify, a 
theory. 
57. See WALKER, supra note 56, at 79. 
58. See Andenaes, General Prevention Revisited: Research and Policy Implications. 66 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 338, 362 (1975). 
59. Hawkins, supra note 20, at 569. 
60. See GIBBS, supra note 26, at 19. Similarly, Nigel Walker posits that conformity 
resulting from moral scruples is not deterrence. See Walker, supra note 8, at 131. 
61. Id. 
62. See GIBBS, supra note 26, at 149. 
8 
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is to be effective in deterring criminal behavior, the threatened pun-
ishment must be imposed.la In a nonsadistic society the justification 
for the deliberate infliction of pain on a human being must be very 
strong if that society hopes to avoid severe condemnation from its 
members and from other societies. 
Deterrence theory thus is confronted with a dilemma regarding 
punishment: to secure the public good of obedience to the law, the 
public evil of punishment must be accepted.84 This virtual paradox 
not only draws deterrence theory qua theory into question, but also 
represents the ultimate pitfall of the theory as a viable social tool. 
Once a crime has been committed, the threat of punishment to 
prevent that particular crime no longer has a purpose that is justifia-
ble within deterrence theory. The threat of punishment has failed to 
deter the commission of the offense. Clearly the courts cannot undo 
the crime by punishing the offender. Consequently, judges may be 
inclined to impose less punishment that the legislatively authorized 
maximuml~ because the benefit to society, which justified the pun-
ishment in the first place, appears to have diminished. Deterrence as 
a theoretical model begins to feed on itself and, in the process, de-
vours the deterrent effect of threatened punishment. Deterrence 
alone is, therefore, an insufficient justification for punishing crime.11 
Moreover, judges and legislators might be tempted to avoid this 
undesirable result by invoking deterrence in support of harsher 
sentences. Harsh sentences, however, tend to arouse the public's 
sympathy for the offender, and a criminal justice system that pro-
duces emotional support in the citizenry for those who violate the 
law is inefficient and is unlikely to maintain the public's respect.17 
An additional criticism is that deterrence theory sanctions the 
conviction and sentencing of an individual solely to provide an effec-
tive threat to the entire society.18 Deterrence theory condones human 
sacrifice, and, thus, victimization acquires a degree of social utility.8s 
63. See WALKER, supra note 56, at 65. See also ANDENAES, supra note 10, at 129-48, 
for a discussion of the morality of deterrence theory. 
64. SEDGWICK, supra note 12, at 40. 
65. [d. 
66. [d. at 42. Sedgwick argues that retribution is needed to strengthen deterrence. He 
defines retribution as righteous indignation based on the intrinsic rightness or wrongness of a 
criminal act. [d. at 43. In the Gregg decision, the Supreme Court stated that retribution, as 
"an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct," is an acceptable 
justification for punishment. 428 U.S. at 183. 
67. See JOHNSON, supra note 55, at 177. Compare Gregg v. Georgi~, 428 U.S. at 183-
84. 
68. See T. HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 52 (1969). 
69. See Walker, supra note 8, at 139; G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Oxford 
ed. 1942) [hereinafter cited as HEGEL]. Some prosecutors have stated that it does not matter if 
an innocent person is punished for a crime; it is important for society only that someone is 
punished. See J. FRANK, r-:OT GUILTY 37 (1957). This extreme reliance on deterrence would 
be effective, of course, only if the public never discovers what has been done. 
9 
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Hegel condemned such punishment when it is imposed for the exclu-
sive purpose of promoting the general good of society.70 This utilita-
rian justification for punishment is no justification in a society in 
which every individual is free and equal under the law. Hegel de-
clared as follows: 
To base a justification of punishment on threat is to liken it to 
the act of a man who lifts his stick to a dog. It is to treat a man 
like a dog instead of with the freedom and respect due to him as 
a man. But a threat, which after all may rouse a man to demon-
strate his freedom in spite of it, discards justice altogether.71 
The utilitarian roots of deterrence theory have been attacked as 
sadistic. One commentator has stated the following: 
The utilitarian . . . who supposedly sees punishment as inher-
ently evil and must therefore demonstrate that the good it brings 
outweighs the bad (i.e., that punishment actually "deters" or 
"prevents" crime), finds himself in the position that he is ad-
ministering an evil even though there is no hard evidence that it 
is doing any good. 
In the face of such uncertainty and doubt about its efficacy, 
why do we persist in its use? . . . Perhaps the . . . reason is 
that we are simply all sadists." 
Deterrence theory is immoral because it treats individuals as 
means rather than as ends. Additionally, the theory relies on mass 
obedience. This reliance is contrary to the historical flow of civiliza-
tion and democracy, which has been moving away from strong cen-
tral governments, coercive force and tyranny.73 Deterrence theory's 
reliance on mass obedience, therefore, is a serious political threat to 
the citizenry of any free nation in which deterrence. theorists influ-
ence the decision making process.74 
Finally, the ambiguity that often pervades the punishment mes-
sage can diminish the deterrent effect. Certainly ambiguity might 
cause a potential criminal to overestimate the severity of punishment 
or governmental willingness to punish the proscribed conduct at all. 
70. HEGEL, supra note 69, at 246. 
71. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized that "[a] penalty also must accord with 'the 
dignity of man; which is the 'basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.' .. Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958». 
72. NEWMAN, supra note 31, at 282. 
73. Id. . 
74. But cf Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 175, in which Justice Stewart announced as 
follows: 
10 
[lIn assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature 
against the constitutional measure, we presume its validity. We may not require 
the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty 
selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved. And a 
heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of the representa-
tives of the people. 
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Thus, a would-be perpetrator might not violate the law because an 
ambiguity in the punishment scheme led him to believe incorrectly 
that the government would impose an intolerable penalty, which the 
government, in fact, would not have imposed. 
Conversely, however, ambiguity might raise heightened expecta-
tions of punishment among potential criminals. When the govern-
ment imposes punishment that is less severe than expected, the pun-
ishment could have a diminished deterrent effect. Thus, a 
government should work to prevent any ambiguity in the perception 
of its will to fight crime and punish criminals. Ambiguity will 
weaken the legitimacy of the system and eventually will undermine 
the government's ability to exercise its police power. 
Deterrence theory thus is fraught with weaknesses. The rational 
actor model, fundamental to deterrence theory, may misrepresent 
the workings of the criminal mind.711 Little proof, if any, can be mus-
tered to support the proposition that punishment has ever deterred 
potential criminals from committing crimes.76 Moreover, deterrence 
theory oversimplifies the life process by not considering the effects of 
adverse or positive social conditions on criminals.77 Similarly, deter-
rence theory has no moral foundation. Critics easily and with credi-
bility can assert that a criminal justice system, which seeks to 
achieve deterrence across the spectrum of society by punishing an 
individual, is inhumane and sadistic.78 Finally, if a system seeks to 
avoid this apparently inhumane result by punishing the perpetrator 
in a less severe manner than was threatened, the deterrent effect of 
the threats crumbles.79 
IV. An Alternative Approach-Toward Social Order 
The theoretical shortcomings of deterrence theory combine with 
practical difficulties to render the theory unpersuasive in explaining 
why criminals violate the law. In modern society, the populace sim-
ply does not believe that law enforcement officials are effective in 
apprehending criminals. Even with unlimited resources, the criminal 
justice system could not solve every crime. With many police depart-
ments and law enforcement agencies understaffed and undersup-
plied, the public's perception probably is that much crime is un-
solved and that many criminals go unpunished. This perception 
probably is strongest among deterrent theory's target group, prospec-
tive criminals, who become convinced that the system simply is not 
75. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. 
76. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
77. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
78. See supra notes 58-59, 63, 67-74 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
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very effective. 
Clearly deterrence theory alone does not explain why people 
generally are law abiding. At one end of the social continuum, a 
fringe group of criminals and deviants exists for whom deterrence 
clearly has failed and will continue to fail. One may hypothesize that 
at the other end of the spectrum a group exists that obeys the law 
out of a sense of moral rectitude and for related noncoercive reasons. 
For this group, threatened punishment plays at most a marginal role 
in their decision to obey the law. What then of the vast middle? 
Why do they obey the law? 
One answer may lie in the perceived legitimacy, or justness, of 
the social order. Obviously if every American taxpayer stopped pay-
ing taxes, the Internal Revenue Service could do very little to compel 
compliance. Nevertheless, Americans dutifully pay their taxes every 
April 15. Why? Perhaps Americans recognize, first, that a govern-
ment has a legitimate interest in collecting taxes and, second, that 
chaos otherwise would be visited upon society. One commentator has 
stated that 
[t]he ultimate explanation of the binding force of law is that 
man, whether he is a single individual or whether he is associ-
ated with other men in a state, is constrained, insofar as he is a 
reasonable being, to believe that order and not chaos is the gov-
erning principle of the world in which he has to live.so 
Crimes punished throughout history are committed every day. 
In the United States, where individuals generally are free to speak 
their minds, bear arms, assemble in public and come and go as they 
please, the vast majority of Americans obey the law. Theorists thus 
should focus more on the individual's respect for or lack of respect 
for societal order and should work to develop programs to strengthen 
respect for order in those who, otherwise, might be criminally 
motivated. 
V. Conclusion 
For too long criminal deterrence theory has been a small tail 
wagging a very large dog. A more appropriate focus is on the per-
ceived legitimacy of the social order and how this perception can be 
engendered and strengthened. Maintenance of societal order cannot 
be attributed to the efficacy of threats of punishment alone. 
One useful lesson may be drawn from the habituating effects of 
the criminal law: experience suggests that perhaps most members of 
society are law abiding because they recognize the benefits of social 
80. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 56 (I963). 
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order and not because they fear apprehension and punishment fo~ 
violations of the criminal law. Legitimacy of the social order and its 
impact on crime therefore deserve more extensive research, examina-
tion and emphasis. 
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